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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
1) Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(2) (1988): 
In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement...ceases if the employee does 
not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier 
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years, 
medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial 
accident. 
2) Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (1987): 
If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial 
Commission within three years after the date of accident of 
the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to 
compensation is wholly barred. 
3) Administrative Rule 568-1-9: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, the Commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting the case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Did the Commission correctly determine that the three-
year statute of limitations for submitting claims for workmens' 
compensation benefits was inapplicable to this case? 
2) Should the Commission have submitted to a medical panel 
the issue of the medical cause of the applicant's present need 
for knee surgery? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1) The Commission's decision concerning the applicability 
of statutory law is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard- Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Bd. of Equalization, 853 
P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1993). 
2) The Commission's application of its own agency rules is 
subject to an intermediate "reasonable and rational" review. 
Willardson v. Industrial Com'n., 856 P.2d 371, 376 (Utah App. 
1993) . The issue of whether the medical reports conflict is a 
factual question, while the issue of whether the Board properly 
determined a medical panel was inappropriate is a legal question. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES BELOW 
1) The first issue was preserved at R. 8, 59. 
2) The second issue was preserved at R. 69-70. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a workers' compensation decision of 
the Industrial Commission awarding the applicant David Wardrop 
medical expenses and temporary total compensation. (R. 64). The 
applicant suffered an industrial accident in 1987, claiming pain 
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in his knee. He then suffered a non-industrial accident when he 
slipped on the ice in 1992 and fell, necessitating knee surgery. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The applicant David Wardrop was employed by Brown & Root 
(petitioners/appellants will be collectively referred to as 
"Brown & Root") as a laborer in 1987. (R. 54). After working 
there for three weeks, he suffered an industrial accident in 
April 1987. (R. 54). As he was climbing out of a hole on the 
worksite, he fell and claimed to feel pain in his knee. (R. 54). 
He continued to work and did not seek medical attention until 
eleven days later, when his supervisor took him to Tanner Clinic 
in Layton. (R. 54-5) . Dr. Taylor of the Tanner Clinic examined 
Mr. Wardrop and ordered an x-ray of the right knee. (R. 55). 
The x-ray was normal, and Dr. Taylor determined that Mr. Wardrop 
could resume work immediately. (R. 55). 
After working for three more weeks, Mr. Wardrop indepen-
dently sought another opinion from Dr. Bean, an orthopedist at 
the Tanner Clinic. (R. 55). Dr. Bean's diagnostic impression 
was a partial or complete tear of the anterior cruciate ligament. 
(R. 55). Dr. Bean recommended that orthoscopic surgery be 
performed on the knee to determine the extent of injury. (R. 
55) . 
On July 14, 1987, Dr. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon, 
performed this surgery and found no pathology. (R. 55-6) . 
Specifically, Dr. Gabbert indicated that the anterior cruciate 
ligament was intact, without any tears in the lateral or medial 
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meniscus. (R. 56). Dr. Gabbert examined Mr. Wardrop again in 
August 19 87 and reported normal walking, no swelling or 
ligamentous instability, full range of motion and good quad 
function. (R. 56). Dr. Gabbert wrote to Brown & Root's 
insurance adjustor the next month and notified it that he did not 
anticipate any permanent impairment to the right knee. (R. 56). 
Mr. Wardrop requested that Brown & Root let him see yet 
another doctor in October 1987. (R. 56). Dr. Janeway of the 
Ogden Clinic became the fourth doctor to examine Mr. Wardrop's 
knee. (R. 56). This time, there was a diagnosis of a 
"disruption" to the right knee anterior cruciate ligament. (R. 
56). Although Dr. Janeway indicated that surgery might be 
advisable in the future, he suggested that Mr. Wardrop do knee 
exercises for the time being. (R. 56-7, 201) (cited pages of 
transcript, Addendum A). 
Except for a $30 bill from Dr. Bean, the doctor Wardrop saw 
without prior approval from Brown & Root's adjustor, Brown & 
Root paid for all medical expenses incurred by Wardrop during 
this time. (R. 53, 173, 195). Wardrop submitted the last medi-
cal bill in September 1988. (R. 53,173). Brown & Root also paid 
Wardrop for two weeks of temporary total disability in July 1987 
while he recovered from the orthoscopic surgery. (R. 53, 173, 
223) . 
After his employment with Brown & Root ended in 1987, Mr. 
Wardrop held at least seven different employment positions 
between 1988 and 1992, including a job mounting and dismounting 
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tires. (R. 223-30). On January 27, 1992, Mr. Wardrop sustained 
a non-industrial injury to his knee; as he was getting out of his 
car and stepping onto his inclined driveway, he slipped on ice 
and fell. (R. 57, 230). Dr. Mayer examined Mr. Wardrop in March 
1992 and diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee 
with a probably stretched anterior cruciate ligament. (R. 58). 
Although Dr. Mayer recommended reconstructive surgery, he 
authorized Mr. Wardrop to return to work without restrictions. 
(R. 58). 
C. Procedural History. 
Mr. Wardrop sought coverage for the surgery and rehabili-
tation period from Brown & Root based upon his contention that 
the 1992 injury was caused by his industrial accident back in 
1987. (R. 178). When Brown & Root denied coverage, he commenced 
this action with the Industrial Commission. (R. 1). 
In October 1993, Dr. Zeluff conducted an independent medical 
examination of Mr. Wardrop at Brown & Root's request. (R. 58). 
After viewing all relevant medical records, Dr. Zeluff stated 
that there was a strong "possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had a 
partial ligament tear in his knee in 1987. (R. 59). Dr. Zeluff 
also noted that Dr. Bean's finding of an anterior cruciate 
ligament problem in 1987 conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's finding 
shortly thereafter of no pathology. (R. 58-9) . 
At the hearing before Administrative Law Judge Elicerio 
("ALJ"), Brown & Root explained that it denied coverage in part 
based on Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99. (R. 59) (Findings and 
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Conclusions, Addendum B). This provision mandates a three-year 
statute of limitations on workmens' compensation benefits, with 
the limitations period running from the time the employee files 
the latest request for coverage.1 (R. 59) . Although the ALJ 
observed that the 1988 version of the provision would time-bar 
Mr. Wardrop's claim for medical expenses if it were retroactive 
to 1987, the ALJ determined that it was not retroactive. (R. 59-
60). In reaching this determination, the ALJ ruled that the law 
existing at the time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident applied. (R. 
60) . 
Brown & Root also requested that the issue of whether the 
1987 accident constituted the medical cause of Mr. Wardrop's 1992 
injury be submitted to a medical panel. (R. 60). The ALJ 
declined to do so, stating that 
[t]he conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. Janeway could be 
seen as controverting opinions, warranting a referral to a 
medical panel for additional input. However, Dr. Janeway is 
unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is unclear 
whether he would feel that this subsequent accident 
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury. 
(R. 60). 
The ALJ continued that even if the physicians did hold conflict-
ing medical opinions on whether the 1992 slip aggravated the 1987 
!This statute of limitations has been amended several times. 
In 1986, the three-year period was prescribed in §35-1-99, and 
applied to "payments of compensation." The legislature amended 
the provision in 1988 as §35-1-99(2), applying the limitations 
period to "medical expenses." The legislature changed the 
provision's wording, but not the overall meaning, in 1990, and 
moved it to §35-1-98(1). (R. 59-60). 
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injury, it was irrelevant because the effects of aggravating 
incidents are compensable. (R. 60-1) . 
Because the ALJ misconstrued the nature of the medical 
controversy, Brown & Root clarified in its Motion for Review to 
the Board that there were conflicting medical opinions regarding 
whether the 1992 slip was an independent injury unrelated to the 
1987 industrial incident. (R. 69-70) (Motion, Addendum C). 
Thus, the medical controversy that concerned Brown & Root was not 
whether the 1992 slip aggravated a 1987 injury, but whether the 
1992 slip constituted the sole cause of Mr. Wardrop's need for 
surgery. (R. 71). 
Upon Brown & Root's Motion for Review, the Board affirmed 
the ALJ's decision. (R. 86-90) (Order on Motion for Review, 
Addendum D). The Board agreed that §35-1-99 (1988) was not 
retroactive, remarking that the law in effect at the time of the 
industrial accident governs. (R. 88). The Board also confirmed 
the ALJ's refusal to submit the issue of whether the 1987 
incident caused the 1992 injury to a medical panel, stating that 
the medical opinions were in "substantial agreement" that Mr. 
Wardrop's 1987 incident caused his current knee problems. 
(R. 87-8). 
Brown & Root sought judicial review of this case by filing a 
Petition for Writ of Review with this Court on October 26, 1994. 
(R. 93-6) . 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Because §35-1-99 (1988) is a procedural statute of 
limitations, it can be made retroactive to prevent Mr. Wardrop's 
untimely claim for medical expenses. Even if this Court were to 
accept the Board's position that the limitations period in effect 
at the time of injury governs, §35-1-99 (1987) applies to time-
bar Mr. Wardrop's claim for temporary total compensation. 
Regardless of the propriety of the Board's decision that §35-1-99 
(1988) is not retroactive, the Board acted improperly in awarding 
Mr. Wardrop both medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation. 
POINT II: The medical opinions regarding whether the 1987 
incident constituted the "genesis" of the 1992 injury are 
conflicting because the physicians express varying degrees of 
uncertainty on this issue. The Industrial Commission erred in 
refusing to refer this significant medical controversy to a 
medical panel for resolution. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
§35-1-99 (1988) APPLIES 
RETROACTIVELY TO TIME-BAR MR. WARDROP'S 
CLAIM FOR THE MEDICAL EXPENSES OF HIS SURGERY. 
The limitations period in effect at the time of Mr. 
Wardrop's 1987 industrial incident provided that: 
If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial 
Commission within three years after the date of the accident 
or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right 
to compensation is wholly barred. 
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Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Utah courts have construed "compensation" to exclude medical 
expenses. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Com'n, 597 P.2d 
875 (Utah 1979). 
In 1988, the Utah Legislature amended this provision 
expressly to encompass medical expenses: 
In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement...ceases if the employee does 
not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier 
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years, 
medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial 
accident. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(2) (1988). 
Consequently, if this Court applies §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively 
to the date of Mr. Wardrop's industrial accident, his claim for 
medical expenses of the knee surgery is time-barred. 
A. This Court Should Prohibit Mr. Wardrop's Untimely Claim 
For Medical Expenses. 
The Commission maintains that the law in effect at the time 
of Mr. Wardrop's claim governs compensability. While this 
principle is generally true, there is an exception for procedural 
laws such as statutes of limitation. Neither the ALJ nor the 
Board mentioned this or any other exception in their decisions. 
They based their determination that §35-1-99(2) (1988) could not 
apply retroactively on a general legal principle without 
considering whether the exceptions might apply. 
In Kofoed v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah, 872 P.2d 484, 486 
(Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted), this Court reiterated one 
of these exceptions; if a statute is procedural in nature, it 
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will apply retroactively to the date of injury. The rationale 
behind this exception is that procedural statutes do not destroy 
substantive rights, so retroactive application would not 
completely eliminate a cause of action. Pilcher v. State Dept. 
of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court has designated statutes of limitations as 
procedural in nature. In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 
1993), the court explained that limitations periods 
do not abolish a substantive right to sue, but simply 
provide that if an action is not filed within the specified 
time, the remedy is deemed to have been waived.... Thus, 
the barring of the remedy is caused by a plaintiff's failure 
to take reasonable steps to assert the cause of action 
within the time afforded by the statute. 
Id. at 575. See also Financial Bancorp v. Pingree & Dahle, 
880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted) 
(limitations periods are procedural). 
Applying §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively to time-bar the claim 
of medical expenses would not work to deprive Mr. Wardrop of a 
substantive right. He was placed on notice in 1988, when the 
provision went into effect, that Utah enforced a three-year 
limitations period for submission of medical expense claims. If 
Mr. Wardrop suspected in 1988, as he claims he did (R. 201), that 
he might need knee surgery in the future due to the 1987 
accident, he should have requested an extension of time from 
Brown & Root in which to submit medical expenses. Alternatively, 
if the 1987 injury so debilitated him even before his 1992 slip 
on ice, as he claims it did (R. 203), he should have opted for 
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the surgery sooner. Instead, he waited more than three years, 
after being notified by Dr. Janeway that he might need surgery 
and after being placed on notice of the limitations period, 
before finally deciding to have the knee surgery in 1992. §35-1-
99 (1988) afforded him three years to decide whether he needed 
knee surgery. When the three years passed, his claim to 
compensation became stale. 
At the same time, not applying §35-1-99 (1988) retroactively 
would prejudice Brown & Root. As with all statutes of 
limitations, the policy justification for the three-year 
limitations period on submission of medical expenses is to 
protect the employer from stale claims. Currier v. Holden, 862 
P.2d 1357, 1369 (Utah App. 1993). Furthermore, the limitations 
period contains an implicit presumption that medical expenses 
incurred more than three years from the last date of payment are 
too causally remote from the industrial injury to be compensable. 
In this case, the applicant fell on ice five years after he 
injured his knee at work, more than three years after he stopped 
seeking medical treatment, and some time after working in various 
employment positions. Lest Brown & Root face perpetual 
responsibility for Mr. Wardrop's knee problems, the limitations 
period in §35-1-99 (1988) cuts off Mr. Wardrop's ability to seek 
workmens' compensation from a long-past employer. 
Since §35-1-99(2) (1988) is a procedural law, the Commission 
erred in determining that it did not apply retroactively to 
preclude Mr. Wardrop's belated claim for medical expenses. 
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B. Even If This Court Determines That The Law In Effect At 
The Time Of Mr. Wardrop's Injury Governs His Action, The 
Limitations Period Still Time-Bars His Claim For Temporary Total 
Compensation. 
Even if this Court concludes that the procedural exception 
to the principle that the law in effect at the time of injury is 
inapplicable, Mr. Wardrop is still not entitled to the 
Commission's entire award of workmens' compensation benefits. 
Besides requiring Brown & Root to pay for Mr. Wardrop's knee 
surgery expenses, the Commission ordered it to pay Mr. Wardrop 
temporary total compensation during his recovery from surgery. 
However, the law in effect at the time of Mr. Wardrop's 
industrial accident, §35-1-99 (1986), specifies a three-year time 
limit for seeking "compensation," commencing from the date of the 
last payment of compensation. Brown & Root's latest payment of 
compensation to Mr. Wardrop came in July 1987, when it paid him 
temporary total compensation after his orthoscopic surgery. The 
statute of limitations on any claim for temporary total 
compensation ran in 1990. Due to the more than three-year hiatus 
in his demands for temporary total compensation, his current 
claim for this type of compensation is "wholly barred" under §35-
1-99 (1986). 
This Court should apply §35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively to 
Mr. Wardrop's 1987 injury date because it is a procedural statute 
of limitations. Since Mr. Wardrop failed to submit medical bills 
for a three-year period, his current request for knee surgery 
coverage is untimely. On the other hand, if this Court accepts 
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the Commission's legal conclusion that the statute is not 
retroactive, this Court must necessarily apply §35-1-99 (1986), 
which precludes Mr. Wardrop's claim for temporary total 
compensation. Regardless of which law this Court deems 
applicable, the fact remains that the Commission awarded Mr. 
Wardrop more relief than what he was entitled to receive under 
statute. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED BY REFUSING 
TO SUBMIT A SIGNIFICANT MEDICAL CONTROVERSY 
TO THE MEDICAL PANEL. 
The ALJ declined to assemble a medical panel in this case 
even though the opinions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. Janeway "could be 
seen as controverting;" the ALJ felt that any controversy 
regarding the aggravating degree of the 1992 slip was irrelevant 
to compensability. (R. 60). The Board affirmed the ALJ's 
decision not to submit the medical evidence to a panel, stating 
that the medical opinions were in "substantial agreement."2 (R. 
88) . 
However, the medical controversy Brown & Root requested a 
medical panel resolve was not the degree to which the 1992 slip 
aggravated a 1987 injury. Instead, Brown & Root recognized 
differing medical opinions on whether the 1992 slip was an 
2To the extent Brown & Root challenges the Board's factual 
finding that the medical reports were in "substantial agreement," 
Subpart A of Point II marshals the medical evidence from all 
physicians examining Mr. Wardrop's knee and shows the evidence to 
be in substantial disagreement. 
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independent injury. (R. 67-70) . Because this controversy 
affects whether the 1992 injury was work-related, it is 
significant to compensability in this case. 
A. The Medical Reports Conflict On Whether The 1987 
Incident Constituted A Knee Injury Requiring Eventual Surgery. 
In part due to the number of physicians Mr. Wardrop felt it 
was necessary to consult after his 1987 incident, medical 
opinions regarding its severity run the gamut. The first 
physician to examine Mr. Wardrop in 1987, Dr. Taylor, diagnosed a 
right knee strain and recommended Mr. Wardrop return to work with 
no heavy lifting. (R. 55). An x-ray of his knee read normal. 
(R. 55). He next visited Dr. Bean, who did not recommend 
reconstructive surgery. However, Dr. Bean felt, unlike Dr. 
Taylor, that the injury warranted orthoscopic surgery because he 
suspected a torn medial meniscus and torn anterior cruciate. (R. 
55). 
After Dr. Gabbert completed the orthoscopic surgery, he did 
not find any pathology. Particularly, he discovered no tear in 
either the medial meniscus or the anterior cruciate. (R. 56). 
Dr. Gabbert continued to see Mr. Wardrop after the orthoscopic 
surgery and concluded that Mr. Wardrop would not suffer permanent 
impairment to his knee. (R. 56). 
Finally, Dr. Janeway examined Mr. Wardrop in late 1987 and 
diagnosed a "disruption" of the anterior cruciate ligament. 
Unlike prior examining physicians, Dr. Janeway indicated that the 
knee "probably" required surgery. (R. 56). 
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Mr. Wardrop did not see another physician for his knee until 
four years later, after he slipped on ice in 1992. Dr. Mayer 
suspected a "stretched-out" anterior cruciate ligament. 
Nonetheless, he authorized Mr. Wardrop to return to work without 
restrictions. (R. 58). After initiating his workers' 
compensation claim, Mr. Wardrop was examined by Dr. Zeluff in 
1993. Dr. Zeluff noted a "strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop 
exhibited a partial tear in the anterior cruciate ligament in 
1987. (R. 59). 
After outlining the differing opinions regarding the 
severity of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 injury, it is difficult to imagine 
how the Board found them to be in "substantial agreement." At 
one end, Dr. Taylor and Dr. Gabbert found no pathology and did 
not expect permanent impairment. At the other end, Dr. Janeway 
diagnoses a "probable" need for surgery. In the middle lie Dr. 
Bean's impression of definite tears in the medial meniscus and 
anterior cruciate, contrasted with Dr. Mayer's 1992 suspicion of 
a "probable" "stretched-out" anterior cruciate, contrasted with 
Dr. Zeluff's 1993 impression of a "possible" tear in just the 
anterior cruciate. 
The physicians' differing opinions on the severity of the 
1987 knee injury cannot be reconciled because they vary on 
whether there was a detectable injury at all in 1987, on the 
certainty of injury, on whether surgery was necessary before 
1992, on what parts of the knee were injured, and on the extent 
to which these parts were injured. In a case with a similar 
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uncertainty regarding the work-related nature of an injury, 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987), the 
examining physicians displayed varying degrees of certainty that 
the claimant's work contributed to his myocardial infarction. 
While one physician felt the work did not contribute to the 
injury at all, another felt it "likely" contributed, while 
another felt it "probably" contributed. The Court characterized 
this medical evidence as "less than conclusive" and 
"conflicting." Id^ . at 239, 240. 
The significant medical issue in this case is the cause of 
Mr. Wardrop's current need for knee surgery. The examining 
physicians' opinions differ on whether Mr. Wardrop was injured 
severely enough in 1987 that he would ever require knee surgery. 
Submission of this issue to a medical panel for resolution was 
therefore warranted. See Champion Home Builders v. Indus. 
Com'n., 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985) (may be abuse of discretion 
not to use medical panel where evidence of causal connection 
between work-related event and injury uncertain); Intermountain 
Health v. Bd. of Review. 839 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992) (in 
dicta) (issue of causal connection between back problems after 
non-work exertion and back problems after prior work-related 
accident properly determined by medical panel). 
B. The Commission Erred By Not Referring The Issue To A 
Medical Panel When Such Reference Is Mandatory. 
Agency rule provides that 
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A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
where...one or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. 
R568-1-9A (R. 88). 
This language is not permissive; submission to a medical panel 
becomes mandatory when examining physicians hold conflicting 
opinions on important medical issues in workmens' compensation 
cases. Ashcroft v. Industrial Com'n. of Utah. 855 P.2d 267, 269 
(Utah App. 1993). Since submission to a medical panel was 
mandatory in this case, the Commission erred by not employing a 
medical panel to resolve a significant medical issue. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
The Commission's entire award of workmens' compensation 
benefits to Mr. Wardrop cannot stand. Either the law in effect 
at the time of his injury time-bars his claim for temporary total 
compensation, or the law applied retroactively time-bars his 
claim for medical expenses. Furthermore, the Commission based 
its award of both types of benefits on its conclusion that Mr. 
Wardrop7s need for surgery and rehabilitation is work-related, 
but the medical aspects of this determination should have been 
referred to a medical panel. Based upon the foregoing, Brown & 
Root asks this Court to apply §35-1-99(2) (1988) retroactively to 
time-bar the medical expenses claim, and to remand to the 
Commission for the appropriate award reduction. Alternatively, 
if this Court determines that the law in effect at the time of 
Mr. Wardrop's injury governs, it should conclude that §35-1-99 
(1986) renders untimely his claim for temporary total 
-17-
compensation and remand to the Commission for appropriate award 
reduction. Finally, this Court should remand with instructions 
to submit the medical issues to a medical panel, to determine if 
the remaining claim for benefits is indeed work-related and 
therefore compensable. 
DATED this day of February, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By V u^^ r . £><LG*****^ ^ 
St iua r t L. Poelman 
J u l i a n n e P . B l a n c h 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: PUT THIS ON THE RECORD. THIS IS 
3 CASE NO. 93-561, DAVID WARDROP VS. BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL 
4 SERVICE AND HIGHLANDS INSURANCE. 
5 AND I TAKE IT BLACK, NICOLS & GUIVER IS THE 
6 ADJUSTING COMPANY ON THAT. IS THAT RIGHT? 
7 MR. POELMAN: CORRECT. 
8 THE COURT: MR. WARDROP ISN'T HERE JUST YET, 
9 BUT HE'S ON HIS WAY, AND HE IS REPRESENTED BY -- G. SCOTT 
10 JENSEN, ATTORNEY, IS PRESENT. 
11 MR. JENSEN: THAT'S RIGHT. I'M HERE, YOUR 
12 HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: WE HAVE STUART POELMAN FOR BLACK, 
14 NICOLS & GUIVER HERE. 
15 LET ME ASK MR. POELMAN TO BEGIN WITH: WHAT'S 
16 BEEN PAID ON THIS CLAIM? 
17 MR. POELMAN: THERE WAS A SHORT PERIOD OF 
18 TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY BACK IN 1987. I THINK BETWEEN JULY 
19 THE 14TH AND -- IT WAS TERMINATED ABOUT TWO OR THREE WEEKS 
20 LATER, I BELIEVE. YEAH -- JULY THE 27TH. AND THEN THE 
21 INITIAL MEDICALS WERE PAID BACK IN 1987. THERE HAVE BEEN NO 
22 MEDICALS PAID SINCE -- SINCE SEPTEMBER THE 20TH OF 1988. 
23 (INAUDIBLE.) I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE DATE OF THAT BILL WAS, BUT 
24 AT LEAST THAT WAS THE DATE THAT IT WAS PAID. 
25 THE COURT: I SEE HE SAW -- SAW SOME DOCTOR IN 
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1 THE SURGERY WHILE HE HAD SOME TIME; HE COULD GET AWAY FROM 
2 WORK. THAT'S WHY HE WANTED TO DO IT. BUT HE JUST PUT IT OFF 
3 UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO RECUPERATE. 
4 THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, I THINK THE INITIAL 
5 ANSWER ISN'T REAL CLEAR, AS THEY USUALLY ARE NOT, BECAUSE 
6 THERE IS NO DISCOVERY THAT'S GONE ON AT THAT POINT. 
7 MR. POELMAN, MAYBE YOU COULD EXPLAIN WHY THE 
8 SURGERY'S BEEN DENIED. 
9 MR. POELMAN: BECAUSE HE -- THE REASON HE WENT 
10 TO THE DOCTOR IN FEBRUARY OF '92 WAS BECAUSE HE HAD HAD 
11 ANOTHER ACCIDENT. HE HAD SLIPPED ON SOME ICE AND -- AND 
12 INJURED HIS KNEE AND THEN WENT TO THE DOCTOR. OF COURSE HIS 
13 ATTEMPT HERE IS TO RELATE THAT BACK TO THE '87 INCIDENT. 
14 THE COURT: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
15 MR. POELMAN: BUT WE SENT THE MATTER TO DR. 
16 ZELUFF --
17 THE COURT: UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
18 MR. POELMAN: -- FOR I.M.E. THAT WAS 
19 PERFORMED. HIS -- HIS REPORTS ARE IN THE FILE. AND HE 
20 INDICATED THERE WAS SIGNIFICANT AGGRAVATION OF THE KNEE 
21 PROBLEM AS A RESULT OF HIS SLIPPING ON THE ICE. 
22 THE COURT: OKAY. 
23 MR. POELMAN: SO IT WAS DENIED BECAUSE OF 
24 SUBSEQUENT INTERVENING --
25 THE COURT: OKAY. 
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HAD STILL BEEN BOTHERING ME. HE WAS VERY UPSET WITH ME FOR 
DOING THAT AND TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD TALK ABOUT IT MONDAY WHEN 
I GOT TO WORK. 
Q DID YOU EVER RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR WHAT YOU 
PAID DR. BEAN? 
A NO, I DID NOT. 
Q SO YOU'VE NEVER BEEN REIMBURSED FOR THAT? 
A NEVER. 
Q DO YOU REMEMBER APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH YOU PAID 
HIM? 
A I BELIEVE IT WAS $30. 
Q OKAY. 
A WHEN I REPORTED TO WORK MONDAY I HAD A — THE 
PAPERWORK FROM DR. -- DR. BEAN SAYING THAT I NEEDED 
ARTHROSCOPIC SURGERY; THAT I NEEDED TO BE PUT ON LIGHT DUTY. 
AT WHICH TERM -- AT WHICH POINT I WAS FIRED. 
Q YOU WERE FIRED? 
A FIRED. 
Q WHAT WAS THE REASON GIVEN FOR YOUR TERMINATION? 
MR. POELMAN: I OBJECT TO THAT ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT IT'S NOT THE BEST EVIDENCE. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW, I THINK WE'RE 
GETTING INTO SOME IRRELEVANT STUFF HERE. I'D SORT OF LIKE TO 
GET ON TO THE -- ALL THIS IS -- YOU KNOW, HE'S BEEN PAID FOR 
THIS PERIOD OF TIME, AND IT'S NOT PART OF THE CLAIM. AND A 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 THING THAT HE TOLD ME WAS THAT WHEN HE FELT MY RIGHT KNEE FOR 
2 MOVEMENT OR WHATEVER, THAT MY RIGHT KNEE WAS — 
3 MR. POELMAN: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO HAVE TO 
4 OBJECT AGAIN. NOW WE'RE GETTING INTO A DETAIL OF THE 
5 DIAGNOSIS; ALL OF WHICH, OF COURSE, IS IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS. 
6 THE COURT: UH-HUH. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
7 I'D JUST LIKE HIM TO SKIM OVER THIS PART, MR. 
8 JENSEN. 
9 I MR. JENSEN: OKAY. 
10 THE COURT: (INAUDIBLE.) 
11 Q (BY MR. JENSEN) QUICKLY, WHAT HAPPENED THEN? 
12 A HE ADVISED ME THAT -- TO DO EXERCISES FOR MY KNEE 
13 TO STRENGTHEN THE MUSCLE --
14 Q DID HE EVER ADVISE YOU YOU MAY NEED SURGERY IN 
15 THE FUTURE? 
16 A YES, HE DID. HE --
17 Q DID HE TELL YOU WHEN? 
18 A HE COULDN'T BE SPECIFIC. HE SAID THAT THE -- THE 
19 INJURY WASN'T AS BAD AS HE HAD SEEN, BUT THERE WAS A DEFINITE 
20 INJURY. HE SAID THAT THE KNEE WOULD GET WORSE --
21 Q IT WOULD -- HE SAID IT WOULD GET WORSE? 
22 A YES. AND HE -- HIS RECOMMENDATION WAS TO HOLD 
23 OFF ON THE SURGERY. 
24 Q WHY? DID HE SAY? 
25 A BECAUSE MY — YOU KNOW, MY KNEE WASN'T AS BAD AS 
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1 A YES. 
2 Q TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT THERE? 
3 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
4 Q AND DID YOU FIND EMPLOYMENT? 
5 A YES, I DID. 
6 Q WHERE DID YOU WORK? 
7 A MY FIRST JOB WAS FOR GOODYEAR. 
8 Q OKAY. NOW, YOU WENT A LITTLE BIT OF TIME 
9 BEFORE -- HOW LONG WAS IT UNTIL YOU HAD SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS 
10 AFTER YOU SAW JANEWAY? 
11 A I'VE HAD PROBLEMS ALL ALONG. 
12 Q OKAY. LET'S -- LET'S GET TO --
13 A I -- MY KNEE WOULD STILL LOCK, AND THEN MY KNEE 
14 STARTED POPPING OUT. 
15 Q LET'S -- LET'S GO TO A -- IT'S BEEN ALLEGED THAT 
16 A REPORT WAS MADE. 
17 WHERE WAS THAT REPORT THAT SAID THE SLIP ON THE 
18 ICE? WE'LL GO RIGHT TO THAT. 
19 MR. POBLMAN: IN THE MEDICAL RECORDS. 
20 MR. JENSEN: WHICH -- I'M TRYING TO REMEMBER 
21 WHICH MEDICAL RECORD THAT WAS. 
22 MR. POELMANs WELL, LET'S SEE, I BELIEVE THAT 
23 WAS FROM -- (INAUDIBLE.) 
24 MR. JENSEN: DR. — 
25 I MR. POELMAN: DR. SILLIX. 
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1 HAPPENED WHEN YOU WENT TO SEE THEM? 
2 A I TOLD THEM THAT I WAS CLIMBING OUT OF A PIT, AND 
3 I HAD SLIPPED AND FALLEN BACK INTO THE PIT. AND I EXPLAINED 
4 TO THEM THAT THE PIT WAS TEN TO TWELVE FEET DEEP. WHAT -- I 
5 NEVER EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT AT THE TIME I FELL, I HAD -- MY 
6 KNEES WERE ON THE EDGE OF THE PIT TO CLIMB OUT, SO I WAS 
7 ALMOST OUT OF THE PIT WHEN I FELL BACK INTO THE PIT. 
8 Q DO YOU RECALL THAT AFTER YOU'D SEEN DR. BEAN AND 
9 THEN YOU TALKED TO BARBARA BLACK AND THEN YOU WERE REFERRED 
10 OVER TO FURTHER TREATMENT BY DR. GABBERT -- HE DID THE SURGERY 
11 AND SO FORTH. WERE YOU PAID SOME TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
12 DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME THAT YOU WERE OFF WORK AFTER YOUR 
13 ARTHROSCOPIC SURGERY? 
14 A I BELIEVE I WAS PAID THE $155 A WEEK FOR -- I 
15 DON'T REMEMBER THE LENGTH OF TIME. 
16 Q OUR RECORD WOULD INDICATE THAT THAT WAS UNTIL THE 
17 27TH OF JULY; FROM THE 14TH TO THE 27TH. WOULD THAT BE 
18 APPROXIMATELY RIGHT ACCORDING TO YOUR MEMORY? 
19 A SURE. 
20 Q OKAY. SINCE THE -- OR AFTER YOUR TREATMENT HERE 
21 IN UTAH -- AND THEN YOU SAY YOU MOVED TO COLORADO. WHEN DID 
22 YOU MOVE TO COLORADO? 
23 A '89. 
24 Q WHAT — WHAT EMPLOYMENT DID YOU PURSUE AFTER YOU 
25 WERE TERMINATED AT BROWN & ROOT? 
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1 A UM --
2 Q DID YOU HAVE ANY MORE EMPLOYMENT IN -- IN UTAH 
3 BEFORE YOU MOVED TO COLORADO? 
4 A YEAH, I WENT TO WORK AT TAS GOODYEAR. 
5 Q EXCUSE ME? 
6 A TAS GOODYEAR, T-A-S GOODYEAR. 
7 Q OH, OKAY. AND WHERE IS THAT? 
8 A 1690 WASHINGTON BOULEVARD, OGDEN, UTAH. 
9 Q WHAT DID YOU DO THERE? 
10 A ASSISTANT MANAGER; PRETTY MUCH EVERYTHING. I --
11 I HAD WORKED THERE PREVIOUSLY TO WORKING FOR BROWN & ROOT --
12 Q I SEE. 
13 A -- AND I WENT BACK. 
14 Q HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE? 
15 A I WORKED THERE -- I BELIEVE IT WAS APPROXIMATELY 
16 A YEAR BEFORE I MOVED TO COLORADO. 
17 Q ANY OTHER EMPLOYMENTS IN UTAH BEFORE YOU WENT TO 
18 COLORADO? 
19 A I DON'T -- I BELIEVE THAT WAS THE GENERAL PORTION 
20 OF WHAT HAPPENED. 
21 Q WHAT --
22 A I WENT BACK TO GOODYEAR. 
23 Q WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO FOR TAS GOODYEAR? 
24 A I WAS AN ASSISTANT STORE MANAGER. I WAS IN 
25 CHARGE OF THE STORE PRETTY MUCH. I DID THAT FOR ABOUT SIX 
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1 MONTHS, AND THEN I MOVED TO A MECHANIC POSITION, AS I RECALL. 
2 Q I SEE. 
3 A PRETTY MUCH -- I HAD BEEN WORKING IN SHOPS SINCE 
4 I WAS 16 YEARS OLD, AND I CAN PRETTY MUCH DO ANY JOB IN AN 
5 AUTOMOTIVE SHOP. 
6 Q OKAY. THEN YOU MOVED TO COLORADO -- OR EXCUSE 
7 ME. WHY WERE YOU -- WHY DID YOU TERMINATE YOUR EMPLOYMENT 
8 WITH TAS GOODYEAR? 
9 A I HAD SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS WITH THE SHOP 
10 MANAGER --
11 Q WERE YOU FIRED? 
12 A -- WHEN I MOVED TO MECHANIC. WAS I FIRED? 
13 MR. JENSEN: THAT'S IRRELEVANT, YOUR HONOR --
14 THE WITNESS: NO, I QUIT. 
15 MR. JENSEN: -- OBJECT. 
16 Q (BY MR. POLEHAN) THEN YOU WENT TO COLORADO, 
17 YOU SAY? 
18 A CORRECT. I LEFT GOODYEAR IN -- IN JUNE, AND I 
19 WENT TO COLORADO ON VACATION IN JULY. 
20 Q OF '89? 
21 A OF '88. 
22 Q OH, OKAY. 
23 A OR WAS IT '89? I GUESS '89, YEAH. 
24 Q AND WHO DID YOU BECOME EMPLOYED WITH IN -- IN 
25 COLORADO? 
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A 
Q 
A 
MONTHS. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
BAILEY TIRE & SERVICE WAS MY FIRST JOB. 
AND WHAT -- HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE? 
I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY; EIGHT MONTHS, SIX 
AND WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO? 
I STARTED OUT AS A TIRE BUSTER. 
A TIRE WHAT? 
BUSTER; MOUNTING, DISMOUNTING TIRES. 
OKAY. 
WORKING ON SEMI TIRES. AFTER TWO OR THREE MONTHS 
I MOVED TO ASSISTANT STORE MANAGER THERE. 
Q OKAY. AND WHAT WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR TERMINA-
TION FROM THAT? 
A I WAS FIRED. 
Q WHERE DID YOU GO TO WORK AFTER THAT? 
A METRIC AUTOMOTIVE. 
Q AND HOW LONG DID YOU WORK THERE? 
A FOUR YEARS; THREE, FOUR YEARS. 
Q YEAH. UP -- UP UNTIL WHEN? 
A UP UNTIL AUGUST OF -- IT WOULD BE LIKE A YEAR AND 
A HALF AGO. THAT WOULD BE — 
THE COURT: '92. 
THE WITNESS: RIGHT. CAUSE I CAME OVER HERE IN 
'93, YEAH. AUG -- THE END OF AUGUST OF '92. 
Q (BY MR. POELMAM) MY RECORD INDICATED OCTOBER 
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1 OF '92. WOULD THAT BE MORE ACCURATE? (INAUDIBLE.) 
2 A I ACTUALLY LEFT METRIC IN AUGUST, BUT I WAS STILL 
3 PAINTING CARS FOR THE OWNER OF METRIC FOR A MONTH AND A HALF 
4 UNTIL OCTOBER OR WHATEVER. 
5 Q I SEE. OKAY. WHAT KIND OF WORK DID YOU DO 
6 WORKING FOR METRIC? 
7 A EVERYTHING. I MANAGED THE PARTS STORE. I 
8 MANAGED THE SHOP, THE TWELVE-DAY SHOP. I WORKED AS A 
9 MECHANIC. PAINTING CARS FOR DARIN. I DID PRETTY MUCH 
10 ANYTHING HE ASKED ME TO DO. WHEN I WAS ORIGINALLY HIRED I WAS 
11 ORIGINALLY HIRED TO HANDLE PARTS. HE OPENED UP A PARTS STORE 
12 WHICH I BECAME THE ASSISTANT MANAGER, THEN EVENTUALLY BECAME 
13 THE MANAGER. 
14 I Q I SEE. 
15 A AND ALSO SERVICE MANAGER OF THE SHOP. 
16 Q OKAY. AND WHY WERE YOU TERMINATED THERE OR WHAT 
17 WAS THE REASON FOR YOUR TERMINATION? 
18 MR. JENSEN: OBJECTION. THAT'S IRRELEVANT, 
19 YOUR HONOR. 
20 MR. POELMAN: I THINK IT GOES TO THE ISSUE I 
21 MENTIONED EARLIER. 
22 THE COURT: HE CAN GO AHEAD AND ANSWER IT. 
23 I'M — I'M NOT SURE WHAT THE RELEVANCE IS, BUT. . . 
24 THE WITNESS: DISAGREEMENT ON BUSINESS 
25 PHILOSOPHIES. 
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Q 
TERMINATED 
A 
0 
A 
Q 
(BY MR. POLEMAN) WERE YOU INVOLUNTARILY 
THEN? 
INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATED? 
YES. 
I LEFT. 
DID YOU APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COM -- OR 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AFTER THAT? 
A 
Q 
A 
NO, SIR. 
YOU DIDN'T? 
NOT -- (INAUDIBLE.) I HAVE APPLIED FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, YEAH. 
Q 
COLORADO? 
A 
OR THE END 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
DID YOU APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN 
YEAH, I DID. I APPLIED IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR 
OF NOVEMBER. 
OF '92? 
3. 
'93? 
'93. 
OKAY. 
I — I -- I HAD SOLD THE BMW THAT I OWNED. 
ACTUALLY DARIN, THE OWNER OF METRIC, AND I WERE -- WE BOTH 
OWNED THE 
OWNED 20. 
Q 
CAR TOGETHER. I OWNED 80 PERCENT OF THE CAR; HE 
OKAY. 
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1 A I -- IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING METRIC AUTOMOTIVE 
2 I DIDN'T APPLY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT. I DIDN'T DO IT UNTIL LIKE A 
3 YEAR AND TWO MONTHS LATER OR WHATEVER. 
4 Q WHEN? 
5 A A YEAR AND TWO MONTHS LATER. 
6 Q OKAY. AND SO THAT WAS IN NOVEMBER OF '93 THAT 
7 YOU APPLIED FOR IT? 
8 A END OF NOVEMBER, FIRST OF DECEMBER. I BELIEVE IT 
9 WAS ACTUALLY LIKE RIGHT AROUND THE FIRST OF DECEMBER. 
10 Q OKAY. THEN WHAT DID YOU DO AFTER YOU LEFT METRIC 
11 AUTOMOTIVE? 
12 A WORKED IN ANOTHER SHOP IN COLORADO FOR -- I 
13 PAINTED CARS FOR DARIN UNTIL LIKE OCTOBER. THE WHOLE MONTH OF 
14 NOVEMBER I WAS ON VACATION OVER HERE. DECEMBER I WENT BACK, 
15 AND I WORKED THE MONTH OF DECEMBER. 
16 Q WHERE? 
17 A AT HOT AUTOMOTIVE. 
18 Q DOING WHAT? 
19 A YOU KNOW, MECHANIC ON CARS. 
20 Q OKAY. FOR HOW LONG? 
21 A I CAME OVER HERE TO UTAH ON VACATION AGAIN ON THE 
22 6TH OF JAN -- JANUARY. 
23 Q THIS WAS '93? 
24 A CORRECT. 
25 Q OKAY. AND HOW LONG WERE YOU ON VACATION? 
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1 A I GUESS I STILL AM. 
2 Q OKAY. YOU HAVEN'T GONE BACK TO ANY WORK? 
3 A I WORKED FOR KELLY SERVICES FOR TWO TO THREE 
4 WEEKS. I WORKED OUT AT A PLACE CALL FAB-ALL (SIC) ACTUALLY. 
5 Q WELL, OKAY. ANYWAY, THE -- THE INCIDENT THAT YOU 
6 DESCRIBED WHERE YOU SLIPPED ON THE ICE WHEN YOU WERE GETTING 
7 OUT OF YOUR CAR --
8 A UH-HUM. (AFFIRMATIVE.) 
9 Q -- YOU INDICATED THAT -- THAT YOU WERE IN A 
10 DRIVEWAY; THAT THE DRIVEWAY WAS ON AN INCLINE. IS THAT 
11 CORRECT? 
12 A YEAH. 
13 Q AND THERE WAS ICE ON THE DRIVEWAY? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q WAS THE DRIVEWAY SURFACE WHERE YOU SLID -- WAS 
16 THAT ASPHALT OR -- OR CEMENT? 
17 A CEMENT. 
18 Q AND YOU SAID YOU -- WHEN YOU SLIPPED YOUR -- YOU 
19 FELT YOUR KNEE POP? 
20 A IT POPPED OUT, YES. 
21 Q UH-HUM, AND YOU -- YOU FELL DOWN. DID YOU FEEL 
22 PAIN IN YOUR KNEE AT THE TIME? 
23 A VERY MUCH SO. 
24 Q VERY MUCH SO? 
25 A YES. 
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ADDENDUM B: FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-561 
• 
DAVID WARDROP, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL * AND ORDER 
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE * 
(Black, Nicols & Guiver = * 
Adjustor), * 
Defendants• * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
January 31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said 
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and was represented by G. 
Scott Jensen, Attorney. 
The defendants were represented by Stuart Poleman, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for benefits associated with a 
proposed surgery on the applicant's right knee. The applicant 
claims that the cause of the need for the surgery is an April 23, 
1987 industrial right knee injury. The adjustor originally 
accepted liability for the knee injury and paid medical expenses 
and temporary total compensation (TTC) from July 14, 1987 through 
July 27, 1987 while the applicant recovered from an arthroscopic 
surgery on the right knee. Payment of medical expenses continued 
through some time in 1988 and then no further medical expenses were 
incurred until 1992. The adjustor declined to pay further expenses 
in 1992 because: 1) the applicant went more than 3 years without 
incurring or submitting related medical expenses and per the 
current reading of U.C.A. 35-1-98(1) this causes the applicant's 
medical benefit entitlement to cease and 2) the applicant sustained 
a subsequent non-industrial injury that caused aggravation to the 
right knee and caused the need for the more recent recommendation 
for surgery. 
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The applicants testimony was taken at the hearing and a 
medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l) was entered into evidence at 
that time. Other exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing 
include: Exhibit D-2 (the employer's first report of work injury) 
and Exhibit D-3 (a written notarized statement apparently signed by 
the applicant's prior employer in Colorado). At the close of the 
hearing, counsel for the defendants indicated that he wanted to 
submit an audio tape of the applicant's recorded statement taken by 
the adjustor in June of 1987. Counsel for the applicant objected 
to admitting the tape. The ALJ indicated that counsel for the 
defendant should have a written transcript of the tape prepared 
post-hearing and should provide the applicant and his attorney with 
a copy of the transcript. After counsel for the applicant reviewed 
the transcript, the ALJ determined that he would be allowed to 
submit to the ALJ any objections he had to the admission of the 
transcript and could request a second hearing for cross examination 
of the adjustor who recorded the statement. On February 9, 1994, 
counsel for the defendants wrote the ALJ and indicated that he had 
decided not to request admission of the audio tape or a transcript 
of the tape. As such, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant on 
February 23, 1994 and indicated that she would consider the matter 
ready for order as of the date that counsel for the defendants' 
letter arrived at the Commission (February 9, 1994). 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 24 years old on the date of 
injury, April 23, 1987, and who had no spouse at that time, but had 
one minor child dependent upon him for support. The applicant was 
working for Brown & Root Industrial Service (also listed as Brown 
& Root Construction or Brown & Root USA) as a laborer on April 23, 
1987 and had been so employed for 3 weeks on the date of injury. 
The applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning either 
$5.50/hour or $5.63/hour at that time. The applicant testified 
that on April 23, 1987, he was working on building a burn plant and 
was assigned to clean mud and water out of a pit so that a sump 
pump could be installed. The applicant explained that the laborers 
were using 5-gallon buckets to transfer the mud and water up out of 
the pit. The applicant estimated that the pit was 10 to 12 feet 
deep and he indicated that he had to use a rope to get down into 
the pit. At one point, £he applicant was climbing up out of the 
pit using the rope, and he slipped and fell back into the pit, 
landing with his right,leg on top of an overturned 5-gallon bucket. 
The applicant stated that this fall jarred the knee and caused it 
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to pop. He stated that it was painful for a while, but he managed 
to complete his shift that day. The applicant recalls that he 
reported the injury to his supervisor before leaving work and also 
spoke to him on the phone after he got home. 
The applicant continued to work, doing his normal duties 
after the date of injury. Then, apparently on May 4, 1987, the 
applicant was throwing a large box up into a dumpster and the right 
knee "locked" on him. Apparently, his supervisor took him to 
Tanner Memorial Clinic, in Layton, Utah, on that day, and the 
applicant was seen by Dr. P. Taylor, a family practitioner. Dr. 
Taylor's office note describes the original injury on April 23, 
1987 and diagnoses a right knee strain. Dr. Taylor found no 
specific point tenderness, but did note discomfort along the 
medical collateral ligament. A knee X-ray was read as normal. Dr. 
Taylor determined that the applicant could return to work right 
away, with no running, jumping or heavy lifting. Once again, the 
applicant returned to work, apparently for another 3 weeks, and 
then he decided to to get a second opinion regarding his knee from 
Dr. C. Bean, an orthopedist at the Tanner Memorial Clinic. 
The applicant saw Dr. Bean on May 28, 1987 and his office 
note of that date indicates that the applicant had persistent pain 
and stiffness after the initial injury and had persistent medical 
joint pain and repeated minor strains after the box throwing 
incident. Dr. Bean's diagnostic impression was: 1) torn medial 
meniscus and 2) torn anterior cruciate, partial v. complete tear. 
He recommended light duty and prescribed tolectin. He noted that 
if there was no improvement within the next 6 weeks, he would 
recommend arthroscopic surgery. The applicant testified at hearing 
that when he requested light duty with Brown & Root, he was 
terminated. 
After seeing Dr. Bean, the applicant apparently contacted 
the adjustor and he testified at hearing that the adjustor agreed 
to send him to Dr. C. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon in Ogden, 
Utah. Dr. Gabbert saw the applicant on July 1, 1987, and he noted 
that the discomfort that the applicant had at that time was on the 
medical aspect of the knee. He noted that the applicant had had 3 
or 4 episodes of locking, where it was necessary to massage the 
knee in order to get it to straighten out. He also noted that the 
applicant had a feeling of instability in the knee and that it was 
bothersome going up and down stairs. Dr. Gabbert diagnosed a 
probable torn meniscus and he recommended arthroscopic surgery. 
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The surgery was performed at McKay Dee Hospital on July 14, 1987. 
The operative report indicates that no lateral or medial meniscus 
tears were found and that the anterior cruciate ligament was in 
tact. The post-operative diagnosis was: no pathology found. 
The applicant testified that he continued to have the 
locking problems post-surgery and even fell down once when he tried 
to stand up from a sitting position and the knee locked. He stated 
that Dr. Gabbert did not prescribe any kind of exercises for the 
knee and did not tell him to restrict his activities in any way. 
Dr. Gabbert's July 23, 1987 office note indicates that the 
applicant was progressing satisfactorily and that the applicant was 
released to return to work on July 27, 1987. However, when he saw 
him again on August 19, 1987, he noted that the applicant was still 
having some discomfort, especially when working with torque or when 
he kneeled directly on the knee. Dr. Gabbert noted that the 
applicant could walk without any noticeable problem, that he had no 
swelling or ligamentous instability, that he had full range of 
motion and that he had good quad function. At that point, his 
office note indicates that he recommended isometric quad 
strengthening for what he considered to be subjective knee 
discomfort of uncertain etiology. On September 21, 1987, Dr. 
Gabbert wrote the adjustor and indicated that he anticipated no 
permanent impairment to the right knee. 
Per the applicant's testimony, he spoke with the adjustor 
again in late September or early October of 1987. The applicant 
testified that the adjustor allowed him to select another 
specialist for consultation, as he was still having problems with 
the right knee. The applicant saw Dr. L. M. Janeway, an 
orthopedist at Ogden Clinic on October 28, 1987. There is a 
handwritten office note for that date and a Physician's Initial 
Report of Work Injury form. The office note is mostly illegible, 
but the form indicates that the applicant had mild joint effusion, 
mild anterior cruciate ligament laxity and medial joint tenderness, 
associated with an April 1987 fall into a sump pump hole. The 
diagnosis indicated on the form is: disruption of right knee 
anterior cruciate ligament. The form indicates that Dr. Janeway 
felt that the knee required further evaluation and probable 
surgery. Dr. Janeway's office note indicates that the applicant 
did not show up for his next appointment on November 6, 1987. The 
applicant testified at hearing that Dr. Janeway told him he should 
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just do exercises and that he might need surgery in the future. He 
stated that Dr. Janeway told him that the knee would get worse, but 
that he could hold off on the surgery, because the knee was not 
that bad at that time. It is unclear what the applicant did 
between late October 1987 and March of 1988. 
On March 5, 1988, Dr. Janeway saw the applicant again and 
wrote the adjustor. In that letter, Dr. Janeway notes that the 
applicants right knee was still painful, especially with attempts 
at increased activity. He notes the applicant's symptoms to 
include knee pain and thigh numbness with prolonged sitting and 
occasional locking with increased pain going up and down stairs. 
Dr. Janeway notes that, at that time, he prescribed feldene and 
instructed the applicant to return to him in one week for further 
evaluation. The letter to the adjustor notes that Dr. Janeway 
believed that the applicant had an anterior cruciate ligament 
injury which would continue to stretch and cause increased knee 
instability. He notes that he suspected that the applicant would 
need a brace and/or reconstructive surgery, because one year had 
gone by since the date of injury and he did not believe that time 
alone would return the applicant to normal knee function. Once 
again, it is unclear what the applicant was doing at this 
particular time, but as of June of 1988, he got a job in Ogden, 
Utah at Goodyear, acting as the Assistant Manager there for about 
one year. 
Sometime in the latter half of 1989, the applicant moved to 
Colorado and initially worked at Bailey Tire for an unspecified 
period of time. He then got a job with Metric Automotive and 
worked there until August of 1992. However, in January of 1992, 
the applicant had an aggravating incident to his right knee. The 
applicant testified that on January 27, 1992, he was getting out of 
his car, in his inclining driveway, when his right foot slipped on 
some ice on the ground and he fell to the ground. The applicant 
stated that he feels that the right knee instability that he had 
been having since 1987 contributed to the fall. He apparently went 
to see Dr. P. Sillix, D.O., on the same day, and he completed a 
form there which indicates that his injury was "slipped on ice 
running." At hearing, the applicant tesified that he did sign the 
form in the medical record exhibit and did complete the form. He 
admits writing "slipped on ice" but he denies that he wrote 
"running" on the form. The applicant testified that he never did 
see Dr. Sillix, because he was called away to the hospital. 
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The applicant testified that he called the adjustor some 
time after his fall and told her that he had reinjured the knee. 
He testified that the adjustor gave him permission to see Dr. D. 
Mayer, a physician associated with Grand Junction Orthopedic 
Associates, in Grand Junction, Colorado. The applicant saw Dr. 
Mayer on March 4, 1992. Dr. Mayers office note of that date 
indicates that the applicant had been having persistent problems 
with the right knee since the 1987 injury. He notes that the 
applicant had persistent pain with any activity and that he fell 
down with pain any time he did a pivotal shift. He noted that this 
had occurred one week ago and that the applicant had seen Dr. 
Sillix as a result (perhaps meaning one month ago). Dr. Mayer 
diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee with 
probable stretched out anterior cruciate ligament which was 
essentially non-functional. He noted that he planned arthroscopic 
surgery with a partial medial menisectomy and reconstruction of the 
anterior cruciate ligament, if it was significiantly stretched out. 
Despite these plans, he completed a "work capacity/disability 
report" on March 5, 1992 and he found that the applicant could 
return to work without restrictions at that time. The applicant 
tesitified that when he notified the adjustor regarding Dr. Mayer's 
recommendations, he was initially told that further details would 
be necessary. However, he stated that he was later told that the 
surgery would not be authorized. The applicant stated that he 
could not afford the time off for the surgery at that time if he 
could not get compensation (Dr. Mayer had told him that there would 
be a year of rehabilitation after the surgery) and thus he decided 
not to pursue the surgery. 
The applicant continued to work at Metric Automotive until 
August of 1992 and then he testified that he painted cars for the 
owner of Metric Automotive through October of 1992. He stated that 
he was on a vacation to Utah during November of 1992, and then 
returned to Colorado and worked for Hot Automotive as a 
mechanic/painter during December 1992. In January of 1993, he was 
again in Utah for a vacation and he stated that he saw an attorney 
regarding the knee surgery at that time. The applicant filed his 
application for hearing in May of 1993 and in October of 1993 he 
was seen by Dr. G. Zeluff, an orthopedist, at the request of the 
adjustor. At that point, Dr. Zeluff had most of the applicant's 
medical records for review, but did not have Dr. C. Bean's records. 
On examination of the applicant, Dr. Zeluff noted that the 
applicant definitely appeared to have an anterior cruciate ligament 
insufficiency and some ^ continuing damage to the medical meniscus. 
He noted that "this" could be synovial swelling in the medial 
compartment of the knee. Dr. Zeluff noted that Dr. Bean's apparent 
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findings conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's, in that Dr. Bean apparently 
diagnosed an anterior cruciate problem shortly after the April 1987 
industrial fall, while Dr. Gabbert found no problem with the 
anterior cruciate on arthroscopy. Dr. Zeluff explains that an 
anterior cruciate ligament can look normal on arthroscopic 
examination when in fact it is unstable. He concluded that, 
without Dr. Bean's records, and relying on Dr. Gabbert's findings, 
he would have to say that the applicant had a normal anterior 
cruciate ligament after the April 1987 fall, with the more recent 
findings of insufficiency in that ligament being the result of one 
of the later twisting injuries to the knee, like the fall on the 
ice in January of 1992. 
Dr. Zeluff was later supplied with the records of Dr. Bean. 
He did an addendum report to clarify his conclusions after 
reviewing the records. That clarification report is dated December 
30, 1993. In that report, Dr. Zeluff notes that Dr. Bean felt 
there was an anterior cruciate tear, OR partial tear, at the time 
of his examination. Dr. Zeluff explains that partial tears are 
very hard to diagnose from testing or arthroscopic surgery. Based 
on this new information, Dr. Zeluff revised his conclusion to state 
that he felt there was a strong possibility that there was a 
partial tear to the anterior cruciate ligament in May of 1987, when 
Dr. Bean examined the applicant. However, Dr. Zeluffs ultimate 
conclusion was that the additional twisting injuries that the 
applicant suffered after the April 1987 fall, especially the fall 
on the ice in January of 1992, aggravated the tear and completed 
it. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Three-Year Statute of Limitations: 
The defendants' first defense is that the applicant's claim 
for additional medical expenses related to the proposed surgery is 
barred by the statutory provision specifying a three-year statute 
of limitations for medical expenses. This three-year limitation 
was first specified in U.C.A. 35-1-99(2) as it was amended in 1988, 
That provision is now located in U.C.A. 35-1-98(1), as it was 
amended in 1990, and reads in pertinent part as follows: 
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... an employee's medical benefit entitlement 
ceases if the employee does not incur medical 
expenses reasonably related to the industrial 
accident and submit those expenses to his employer 
or insurance carrier for payment/ for a period of 
three consecutive years. 
The ALJ finds that if that statutory provision was in effect at the 
date of the applicant's injury, it would probably bar the applicant 
from any claim for additional expenses after 1991. However, that 
provision was not in effect on April 23, 1987, having first become 
effective in 1988. Applying the well established principal that it 
is the law on the date of injury that applies, the ALJ finds that 
the above-cited provision does not apply to the applicant's claim, 
because it was passed and became effective after the applicant had 
his April 23, 1987 industrial injury. The ALJ must therefore 
dismiss the defendants' first defense. 
Subsequent Accident Compensability: 
The defendants argue that the cause of the most recent 
recommendation for surgery is the January 27, 1992 non-industrial 
fall and not the April 23, 1987 industrial accident (per Dr. 
Zeluff). The applicant claims that the cause of the most recent 
recommendation for surgery is the April 23, 1987 industrial 
accident, as it was noted as early as March of 1988 that the 
surgery would be needed eventually as treatment for the industrial 
accident (per Dr. Janeway) . The conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr. 
Janeway could be seen as controverting opinions, warranting a 
referral to a medical panel for addtional input. However, Dr. 
Janeway is unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is 
unclear whether he would feel that this subsequent accident 
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury. Thereforef 
it is not clear that there is any controversy regarding whether an 
aggravation occurred in January of 1992. This makes the need of 
additional medical input less clear. In addition, claifying 
whether or not an aggravation did occur appears to be unnecessary* 
This is true because the ALJ finds that, even presuming that the 
1995 fall aggravated the injury caused by the April 1987 industrial 
fall, the effects of that aggravation are compensable. 
Professor Larson has stated the rule on compensability of 
subsequent accidents to be as follows: 
0060 
ORDER 
RE: DAVID WARDROP 
PAGE 9 
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out 
of and in the course of employment, every natural 
consequence that flows from the injury likewise 
arises out of the employment, unless it is the 
result of an independent intervening cause 
attributable to the claimant's own intentional 
conduct. 
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §13.00 (Desk Ed. 1988). In 
discussing complications that follow the initial or primary injury, 
Larson cites a Utah case, Perchelli v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n, 
475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970), in which it was determined that a sneeze 
following an industrial back injury (which sneeze caused the need 
for surgery to the back) was compensable. Larson states: 
The case should be no different if the triggering 
epidsode is some nonemployment exertion like 
raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as 
it is clear that the real operative factor is the 
progression of the compensble injury, associated 
with an exertion that in itself would not be 
unreasonable in the circumstances. 
A. Larson, supra, §13.11(a). Larson also notes a category of 
subsequent injuries that he refers to as "weakened member 
contributing to later fall or other injury.11 Id. §13.12. Larson 
states: 
Where the question of intervening cause has arisen 
in the category of cases covered by this 
subsection, it has usually been held that the 
claimant's negligent act broke the chain of 
causation. ... As to what constitutes negligence, 
in these cases it often takes the form of rashly 
undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the 
risk created by the weakened member. 
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In addition to the discussion by Larson regarding subsequent 
accident compensability, there is just one Utah case that is 
particularly on point. That case is Mountain States Casing v. 
McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and involved a work injury causing 
loss of sensation in the hand, which the injured worker later 
burned severely, partially because the loss of sensation prevented 
him from feeling the burn. The Court in that case states: 
A subseqent injury is compensable if it is found to 
be a natural result of a compensable primary 
injury. McKean is not required to show that his 
original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent 
injury, but only that the initial work-related 
accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent 
hand injury. 
Although this seems to be more generous in finding compensability 
than the Larson rule, the Court in McKean does go on to note that 
the applicant's subsequent activity was not negligent or 
intentional, so that it appears that the Court is adopting a rule 
similar to what Larson notes as appropriate. 
Applying the above-stated "rules" to the instant facts, it 
would appear that if the applicant was merely getting out of the 
car when his right leg gave way, partially due to the ice and 
partially due to the longstanding effects of the 1987 injury to the 
ACL, any resulting aggravation to the ACL caused by the fall that 
followed would be compensable. This would be true, because getting 
but of the car was not an unreasonable or negligent act, and 
because the inital work related accident was a contributing cause 
of the fall that occurred after getting out of the car. On the 
other hand, if the fall occurred because the applicant was running 
on the ice, as is suggested by the form completed at Dr. Sillix's 
office, the effects of the fall could be non-compensable. This is 
because the fall might then be considered to be the result of an 
intentional and negligent act, that was a rash undertaking 
considering the fact that the applicant knew that the right leg 
occasionally gave way or locked. 
The ALJ finds that the applicant was not running on the ice 
when the fall occurred in January of 1992 and was actually getting 
out of the car when he slipped on the ice and possibly aggravated 
the ACL injury that he incurred as a result of the industrial fall 
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at issue on April 23, 1987. The ALJ makes this conclusion because 
the form from Dr. Sillix's office contains the only reference to 
running on the ice that has been submitted and there is no other 
confirmation that the applicant was running on the ice when he fell 
in 1992. The applicant testified that he was getting out of the 
car in his driveway when he fell on the ice and he denies that he 
was running on the ice when the fall occurred. The defendants have 
not argued strenuously that the fall occurred while the applicant 
was running and have offered no evidence that would confirm that 
the applicant was running when he fell. In addition, the 
defendants presented written argument regarding the compensability 
of the fall in a post-hearing letter which is based on the 
applicant falling after getting out of the car. 
Because the ALJ finds that the applicant fell on January 27, 
1992 after getting out of his car, partially as a result of ice on 
the driveway and partially as a result of the effects of the April 
23, 1987 injury to the ACL (causing locking and giving way of the 
knee) , the ALJ finds that any aggravation to the right knee caused 
by the January 1992 fall is compensable as a "natural consequence" 
flowing from the April 23, 1987 fall. This conclusion is based 
upon the discussion regarding subsequent injuries in Professor 
Larson's treatise and the adoption of the Larson rule by the Utah 
Supreme Court, as noted in the McKean case cited above. The ALJ 
should point out that she makes no ruling regarding whether or not 
an actual aggravation to the knee occurred on January 27, 1992. 
The ALJ simply finds that even if one did occur, it does not break 
the chain of causation between the April 23, 1987 fall and the 
current recommendation for surgery. Dr. Janeway did note as early 
as March of 1988 that the need for reconstructive surgery was 
anticipated at that point and that the ACL would continue to 
stretch with additional instability in the knee occurring simply as 
a result of the passage of time. Certainly, one legitimate 
interpretation of the medical records in this case is that, per Dr. 
Janeway's prediction, the ACL simply worsened with time and now 
requires surgery. However, as noted above, even if a subsequent 
aggravation (in January of 1992) is causing the need for the now-
recommended surgery, that aggravation is compensable. 
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the defendants should 
pay for the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that is 
currently recommended and should pay the applicant temporary total 
compensation (TTC) during his recovery from the surgery. The 
defendants should withhold 20% of the applicant's TTC for payment 
to the applicant's attorney once the applicant has stabilized. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjustor), pay the applicant, David Wardrop, temporary total 
compensation during the period of his medical instability following 
the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will be performed 
at a future date. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjustor), pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the 
April 23, 1987 industrial accident, including those expenses 
related to the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will 
be performed at a future date; said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root 
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver -
Adjustor), pay G. Scott Jensen, attorney for the applicant, 
attorney fees witheld from the applicants temporary total 
compensation to be paid in the future, in an amount consistent with 
the Commission rule R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter, 
the same to be paid in a lump sum at the time that the applicant 
stabilizes. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal* In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2) Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 1^ 7 day of March, 1994. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
0006i 
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David Wardrop 
406 Colonial 
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Attorney at Law 
205 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
OOOGS 
ADDENDUM C: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR REVIEW 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 93-561 
DAVID WARDROP, 
Applicant, 
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW 
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL 
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE 
(Black, Nichols & Guiver, 
Adjustor), 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to the provisions of §35-1-82.53 of the Utah Code, 
defendants move the Commission for its review of Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein dated March 17, 1994, 
as follows: 
FACTS 
The basic facts describing this proceeding and the evidence 
presented is substantially outlined in the Findings of Fact 
issued by the Administrative Law Judge herein and, thus, will not 
be restated here. The proper application of the facts as 
contained in the record will be referenced in the argument set 
forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
The industrial accident which occurred on April 23, 1987, 
while the applicant was working for Brown & Root, simply 
consisted of his slipping back into a hole out of which the 
applicant was climbing and allegedly feeling some pain in his 
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right knee. As shown by the medical records, he did hot "seek!" 
treatment for his knee until some 11 days later when ccrr Jf^ y 4, 
1987, he went to the Tanner Clinic. There his knee wab ir-Yayed, 
and he was returned to work. Then some three-plus weeks 
thereafter, he went on his own to see Dr. Bean who recommended 
arthroscopic examination in order to determine the extent of 
injury. Inspection of ligaments and the lateral and medial 
meniscus was performed by arthroscopic examination by Dr. Gabbert 
on July 14, 1987. He found the ligaments intact and no tears in 
either the lateral or medial meniscus. No pathology was found. 
Followup reports of Dr. Gabbert reported normal walking, no 
swelling nor ligamentous instability, full range of motion and 
good quad function, and no anticipated permanent impairment. 
Although the applicant did consult with Dr. Janeway in October 
1987, and March 1988, it is not known that Dr. Janeway was 
provided with the prior records of Dr. Gabbert in order to 
confirm or dispute Dr. Gabbertfs findings. In any event, the 
applicant did, over the next several years, work for different 
employers in jobs requiring the active use of his right knee, and 
he did so without the need for any additional medical treatment 
nor any reported impairment with respect to his work activity or 
other lifefs activities. (J3ee Affidavit of Darin Carei [Exhibit 
D-3].) Thus, the evidence presented requires one to conclude 
that the industrial accident of April 23, 1987, was not severe, 
was adequately treated and that no pathology resulted as was 
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determined by a visual inspection of the knee made* pursuant £o 
arthroscopic examination. •;• •*. 
It was not until after the applicant sustained a»" *•* 
nonindustrial injury to his right knee on January 27, 1992, that 
additional treatment and surgery on the knee was prescribed. On 
that date, while stepping out of his car upon a sloping, ice-
covered cement driveway, the applicant's foot slipped out from 
under him causing the leg to extend out from underneath him and 
causing him to fall to the ground. There is no question but what 
said accident was severe in its trauma and that it caused 
substantial injury to the knee. The applicant testified that at 
the time of said accident, he felt a popping and experienced 
severe pain in the knee. He further testified that substantial 
swelling ensued which required him to pack his knee with ice for 
a period of about ten hours. Thus, both the accident and the 
injury which occurred on 1/27/92 can, based upon the evidence 
presented, only be found to be both substantial and independent 
of the applicant's prior knee injury which had occurred almost 
five years before. It is submitted that there is no substantial 
evidence in the record from which one can conclude that the 
applicant's foot slipped out from under him on the icy driveway 
because of any weakness attributable to the prior industrial 
accident. The applicant's foot slipped on the ice because of the 
ice—not because of any weakness in the knee. The applicant has 
produced no substantial evidence to prove otherwise. He 
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certainly has not produced a preponderance of evidence**on that 
fact, which is his burden. •;•
 #\ 
Defendants have no quarrel with the principle citkd'Uy the 
Administrative Law Judge in citing Larson. Note, however, that 
Larson finds compensable "every natural consequence that flows 
from the injury..." It can hardly be said that the applicant's 
slipping and falling on an icy cement driveway was the "natural 
consequence" of his prior industrial injury. It is also 
instructive that Larson indicates that the triggering occurrence 
may be found to be compensable "so long as it is clear that the 
real operative factor is the progression of the compensable 
injury." In this case, it is far from "clear" that the injury 
which the applicant sustained in January 1992, is "the 
progression of the compensable injury." 
It would appear that the Administrative Law Judge has become 
distracted in her analysis of the facts of this case as it 
relates to the law cited by Larson. In the instant case, it is 
irrelevant as to whether or not the applicant's slipping on the 
ice in January 1992, was a negligent or intentional act since the 
relevant focus should not be upon the nature of the act but 
rather the cause of the occurrence. In this case, there is no 
substantial evidence that the applicant's slipping on the ice was 
in any way caused by industrial injury which occurred in 1987.. 
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred 
in failing to refer this matter to a medical panel for a 
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determination of the medical issues. Since the arthroscopic•• 
examination of the applicants knee in 1987 revealed *>o#\ 
pathology," then it cannot be assumed that any patholcfigy*Existed. 
The mere fact that Dr. Zeluff, who examined applicant in 1993, 
speculated that there was a "strong possibility" that there was a 
partial tear of the anterior cruciate ligament in May 1987, does 
not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof to the effect that 
there was. The preponderance of the evidence is that there was 
no pathology to the applicant's anterior cruciate ligament as 
determined by the visual inspection of Dr. Gabbert in 1987. Any 
opinion to the contrary is, in fact, speculative. It is 
certainly beyond the expertise of the Administrative Law Judge to 
resolve that medical question. 
It is instructive that the Administrative Law Judge refuses 
to make a finding with respect to whether or not the injury of 
1992 was an "actual aggravation" of a pre-existing condition 
since there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding. 
There is, on the other hand, a clear demonstration by the 
evidence that the 1992 accident caused a new and different injury 
and that this new injury is what creates the need for the 
prescribed surgery. 
The primary object of the application in this proceeding is 
to require the defendants to pay for the prescribed surgery. The 
evidence taken as a whole does not preponderate in favor of a 
finding that the surgery is necessitated because of an industrial 
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accident in 1987. On the other hand, it strongly fcreiJonderates 
in favor of a finding that applicants accident in Jaijna^ y 1992, 
was the event that requires the prospective surgery, .IrhV 
prospective surgery is for the purpose of repairing a torn 
anterior cruciate ligament and a torn medial meniscus. None of 
that pathology can be demonstrated to have occurred as a result 
of the 1987 industrial accident. It was clearly the result of 
the 1992 accident. There is no definitive evidence that the 
prescribed surgery would have been necessary had it not been for 
the 1992 accident. 
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred 
in refusing to allow the defendants to pursue inquiry at the 
hearing concerning the applicants criminal record. To the 
extent that the Administrative Law Judge relied upon the 
testimony of the applicant, then his credibility is at issue and 
his criminal record is a relevant matter for consideration in 
that regard. During the course of the hearing, the defendants 
demonstrated that the applicant had been twice convicted of a 
crime; but the applicant's objection to further examination on 
his further criminal record was sustained, and the defendants 
were precluded from making a record on his criminal background. 
It is also submitted that the Administrative Law Judge erred 
in ruling that the three-year statute of limitations relating to 
medical care does not bar the applicant's claim for additional 
medical expenses. Since the three-year statute of limitations 
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became effective on July 1, 1988, and the applicant d*d not incur* 
and submit for payment any further medical expenses fior a period 
• • • 
of at least three years thereafter, the limitation wojijjrf.apply to 
the instant case if it is determined that the statute is 
procedural in nature. If so, it is applicable to all industrial 
accidents whether those accidents occurred before or after the 
enactment of the statute unless some prejudice can be 
demonstrated. The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes of 
limitations are procedural in nature and, therefore, can be 
applied retroactively. Certainly, in this case, the applicant 
should be treated no differently because his industrial accident 
occurred in 1987 as opposed to someone whose industrial accident 
occurred after July 1, 1988. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is submitted that the 
Order requiring the defendants to pay for the applicant's 
prescribed surgery is in error, is not based upon a preponderance 
of evidence, and should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this }£ * day of April, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
C -BSU_ Stuart L. Poelman Attorneys for Defendants 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Gloriann Egan being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
defendants Brown & Root and Highlands Insurance herein; that she 
served the attached DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW (Case Number 
93-561, Utah State Industrial Commission) upon the parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
G. Scott Jensen, Esq. 
205 26th Street #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the /Z2 day of April, 1994. 
Gloriann Egan 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
C X ^ 
73^ day of April, 
1994. 
}IA£<IL^ 
My Commission Expires: 
Qix&n 
Y PUBLIC 
ingipf the State of Utah 
Cynthia Northttrom 
10 CMMi^i « • » , 11tti Fir 
MtUtatClty.Utilt M111 
MyCiwiliilowgxpIr— 
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ADDENDUM D: ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DAVID WARDROP, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
VS. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL * Case No. 93-0561 
SERVICE and HIGHLAND * 
INSURANCE, * 
Defendants. * 
Brown & Root Industrial Service and its insurance carrier, 
Highland Insurance (referred to jointly hereafter as "Brown & 
Root") ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review an 
Administrative Law Judge's Order awarding medical expenses and 
temporary total disability compensation to David Wardrop in 
connection with anticipated surgery to Mr. Wardrop's right knee. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the very thorough findings of fact set 
forth in the ALJ's decision. Those facts are summarized below as 
background for the Commission's decision. 
On April 23, 1987, in the course of his employment by Brown & 
Root, Mr. Wardrop fell and injured his right knee. Although his 
knee hurt, he continued to work. Ten days later, again in the 
course of employment at Brown & Root, his right knee "locked" on 
him. He was first examined a Dr. Taylor and diagnosed with "knee 
strain." Three weeks later, Dr. Bean, an orthopedist, diagnosed a 
torn medial meniscus and damage to the anterior cruciate ligament. 
Brown & Root authorized Dr. Gabbert to perform arthroscopic 
surgery on Mr. Wardrop's knee. During the surgery, Dr. Gabbert 
observed no tears in either the medial meniscus or anterior 
cruciate ligament. During subsequent examinations, Dr. Gabbert 
noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to experience subjective 
discomfort in the knee, but suffered no objective problems. 
In October 1987, Brown & Root authorized Dr. Janeway, also an 
orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. Dr. Janeway diagnosed Mr. 
Wardrop as suffering from disruption of the anterior cruciate 
ligament, associated with his work-related injury. Then, during 
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March 1988, Dr. Janeway noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to suffer 
pain in the knee, attributable to the damaged anterior cruciate 
ligament. Dr. Janeway advised Brown & Root that a brace and/or 
surgery would be required to correct the problem. Mr. Wardrop did 
not pursue the matter further for the next several years. 
On January 27, 1992, as he was stepping out of his car, Mr. 
Wardrop's right foot slipped on ice, causing him to fall to the 
ground. Brown and Root authorized an orthopedic examination by Dr. 
Mayer, who diagnosed a probable stretched anterior cruciate 
ligament and concluded that arthroscopic surgery was necessary. 
Brown & Root declined liability for the anticipated surgery 
and related period of temporary total disability. In response, Mr. 
Wardrop filed an Application For Hearing. Brown and Root then 
arranged for Dr. Zeluff, an orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. 
Dr. Zeluff found "a strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had 
suffered an injury to the anterior cruciate ligament of his right 
knee as a result of his accident at Brown & Root in 1987, which 
injury was then aggravated by Mr. Wardrop's fall on the ice in 
1992. 
Based on the foregoing facts, the ALJ concluded that Brown & 
Root was liable for the anticipated arthroscopic surgery on Mr. 
Wardrop,s right knee, as well as temporary total disability 
benefits during the time required for healing. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Brown & Root's Motion For Review contends that the ALJ erred 
in: 1) concluding that Mr. Wardrop's current knee injury was 
caused by the 1987 industrial accident; 2) declining to refer the 
matter to a medical panel; 3) limiting Brown & Root/s inquiry into 
Mr. Wardrop's criminal record; and 4) concluding that a three year 
statute of limitations adopted in 1988 is inapplicable to this 1987 
accident. Each of Root & Brown,s contentions is discussed below. 
No one disputes Mr. Waldrop's need for surgery to correct the 
damaged anterior cruciate ligament of his right knee. The only 
dispute is whether Mr. Waldrop7s knee injury is the result of his 
1987 industrial accident and therefore compensable under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
Having reviewed the record, the Commission finds the various 
medical opinions to be in substantial agreement that Mr. Waldrop^s 
industrial injury of 1987 is the genesis of his current problem. 
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. 
Waldrop is entitled to payment of medical expenses necessary to 
treat his current knee problem, as well as associated temporary 
disability compensation. 
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Brown & Root also argues the ALJ should have referred the 
medical aspects of this case to a medical panel. The Commissions 
Rule R568-1-9.A. governs the use of medical panels: 
A panel will be utilized . . . where: 
1) One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. . . . 
As previously noted, the various medical opinions in this case 
are in substantial agreement and do not present any significant 
medical issue. The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's 
conclusion that a medical panel is not warranted. 
Next, Brown & Root contends the ALJ improperly limited its 
questioning of Mr. Wardrop on the subject of his criminal record. 
Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, such examination is 
permitted only if the crime in question was of serious magnitude or 
involves dishonesty or false statement. From the record provided 
to it, the Commission cannot conclude that Mr. Wardrop's alleged 
criminal record meets this test of admissibility. Furthermore, 
such evidence would be of limited probative value given the 
objective facts of this case. The Commission therefore affirms the 
ALJ's decision on this point. 
Finally, Brown & Root argues the ALJ erred in rejecting its 
statute of limitations defense. In particular, Brown & Root points 
to Section 35-1-98(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which 
provides: 
. . . an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if 
the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident, and submit those 
expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for 
payment, for a period of three consecutive years. 
As noted by the ALJ, had this provision been in effect at the 
time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident, it might well bar him from 
pursuing his claim, since more than three years has elapsed since 
he last submitted medical expenses to Brown & Root. However, as 
also noted by the ALJ, it is well settled that the law in effect at 
the time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the 
parties in a workers' compensation claim. Kennecott v. Industrial 
Comm. . 740 P,2d 305, 307 (Utah App 1987) Applying the principle of 
Kennecott to this case, Mr. Wardrop's claim is not subject to the 
three year statute of limitations added to the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act in 1988. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission affirms the decision of 
the Administrative Law Judge and dismisses Brown & Root's Motion 
For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this ji day of September, 1994. 
^ lAv^hu . 
S t e p h e n M. Hadl^ey 
Chairto^n 
WL A 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
&4^ ColleenS.Colton 
Commissioner 
ww^ 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
'1 Y 
I certify that on September J 5 , 1994, a copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of David 
Wardrop v. Brown & Root Industrial Service and Highland Insurance, 
Case No. 93-0561, was mailed postage prepaid, first class, to the 
following: 
DAVID WARDROP 
406 COLONIAL 
LAYTON, UTAH 84041 
G. SCOTT JENSEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
205 26TH STREET, #34 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
STUART POELMAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P. O. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE 
BLACK, NICHOLS AND GUIVER 
C/O JAMES BLACK 
P. O. BOX 2615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2615 
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/ 
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Diane Kearns \_ 
Secretary to General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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